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ABSTRACT
The paperopens witha description of the salient features of the
Israelieconomy. These consist of a large government sector(the governnnt
budget has absorbed riore than 80% of GNP in some recent years); highlevels
of defense spending; a large government budget deficit; a large current
accountdeficit (about 20%of GNP); tripledigit inflation; andextensive
indexation of beth wages and longterm financialconimitrrents. A descriptive
nodelof the econany is then presented, which includes the particular
asset menu of the Israeli economy, and its properties examined. Finally,
the rrodel is used in analyzing aspects of the Israeli inflationary experience.
The currency liberalization of 1977, which increased the access of Israelis
toforeign assets, shares respensibility for the high rate of inflation. The
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From 1953 to 1973 real GD? in Israel grew at an annual rate of
nearly 10%; over the next nine years the grewth rate us only 3%, as
Table 1 shows.' Fran 1953 to 1973, the average inflation rate (CPI)
was 7.1%; fran 1973 to 1979 the inflation rate averaged iore than 40%;
arid in the last three years the annual inflation rate has been inthe
triple digit range.
The aims of this paper are to describe the structure and
pert ornnce of the Israeli economy, and to account for the worsening 01
its inflation perfonnce over the last decade. We begin with a
description of the current state and structure of the economy.
*paperoriginally prepared for the Carnegie—Rochester Series on Public
Policy April, 1983.I am i.ncebted to Jacob Frenkel for nrny llpful
discussions which, but for circumstances beyond our control, would have
ledtothis being a joint paper; I am gratefultoo forhis subsequent
ccxnirents.Zvi Auberbach and Zaln.n Shiffer of the Bank of Israel
patiently helped me in the data nze.Helpfulcomments were received
from Haim Barkai, Rudiger Dorntusch, Mordecai Fraenkel, EdiKarni, and
Michael Parkin. Research assistance by David Wilcox and financial
support from the National Science Foundation are acknowledged with
thanks.la
Table 1: Israeli Economic Performance, 1953—1982(%p.a.)
Period 1953—1973 1973—1979 1979—1982
Growth rate of 9.9 3.4 2.3
real GDP
Growth rate of 6.2 1.0 0.3
per capita GOP
Inflation rate 7.1 44.9 122.7
(CPI)
Source:International Financial Statistics and Bank ofIsrael Report,
1982.
Table 2: The Allocation of Resources in Israel, 1978—82
(Shares in GNP, %)
PrivateInvestmentGovernment Exports Imports Net
consumption consumption Civilian tfense exports
63.9 24.8 37.8 49.3 62.09.1 —22.82
TheInflationary Economy.
GNP per capita in Israel at the end of 1981 s about $5500, 45% of
the United States level, roughly at the levels of Greece, Singapore, and
Ireland2 Percapitaconsumption is also about 45% of the UnitedStates
level.P is around $22 billion.
The Structure of Dennd: Table 2 provides a first perspective on
some special features of the Israeli economy. The consumption and
investment shares in GNP are not out of the ordinary. But government
consumptionis extremely high; the average for theOEXD countries is
17%,with the share even in the case of Sweden being less than30%. The
openness of the economy is shownby the large shares of both exports and
imports in GNP, and the balance of trade problem by the rrgnitude of the
importsurplus.3
The dominant role of government and the magnitude of the government
budget deficit are clearly revealed by Table 3,which is basedon IMF
data. Over the past five years government has onaverage disposed of
more than 70% ofGNP and received more than half of GNP inrevenues.
The budget deficit hasaveragedmorethan 20% of GNP. Fiscalyear
1982/3shows the effects of the war in Lebanon, with government
expenditures reaching an extraordinary 90% of GNP, andtaxrevenues
exceeding half of GNP as a result of revenue measures imposed inmid—
1982.It canbe seen that defense spending accounts for mostof
government consumption. Theshareof resources being used for defense
isunderstat?d in the national accounts, in particular because
conscripts arepaida below market wage. Oneestimateis thattotal
resources devoted to defense may be 50% more than the amourt estimated
in the accounts.43
Inflation,theAssetsMarkets, and_Indexation: Figure 1 and Table
4 show CPI inflation rates fourth quarter over fourth quarter. Note in
particular that after 1954 the Israeli economy enjoyed a long period of
single digit inflation. Even after the 1967 war, the inflation rate
rnained in singledigits until 1973.After the Yom Kippur Warthere
weretwyears of inflation near 40%, and then a to year decline in
the inflation rate in 1976 and 1977. Foreign currency holdings re
itheralized at the end of 1977. The inflation rate then increased, but
it was only in 179that itwent above 100%. Sincethen the inflation
rate has remainedina rangeabove 100%.
Indexationof asset returns and wages has been extensive in Israel
for over three decades, despite the fact that th inflation rate was
reasonably low and stable for most of the fifties and sixties.5
Israeli residents ny hold assets with returns indexed to either the
price level or the exchange rate. They have alsobeenentitled since
the 1977 liberalization to hold foreign bank accounts and foreign
currency, up to specifiedlimits.
Table 5showsthe financial asset holdings ofthe public,
excludingownership offoreigncurrency and assets held abroad, for
which there are no data. Shekel denominated (nominal) assets account
for less than 4%offinancial assets.6 Thebulk of thepublic's
financialassets areindexed to the price level, although only a small
.rt of the indexed assets aremarketable.}bst index bonds areheld
indirectly through private pension funds, which areobligedto hold the
bonds.7 Nate the large increase in the share of equity in financial
assets during1982,reflecting a stock market boom.
The significantpoint about Table 5is thatthere aregovernment0
Table3: TheRoleof Government
(SharesinGNP,%)




1978/9—1982/3 52.941.073.4 64.7 20.6 25.5
1982/3 63.652.090.0 78.9 26.4 30.6
Source: IMF.Data arefor fiscal years, which start April1.
Table 4: Inflation Rates, CPI
(%perannum, fourthquarter over fourth quarter)
1967—19731973-751973—7719731979198019311982
10.6 40.0 38.049.2103.4 136.1 104.6130.43b




Category assets GNP3 assets
1. Nominal 3.6 6.2 3.6
Of which: Ml 2.3 4.1 1.6
2. Foreign currency linked 20.2 35.1 14.8
Of which: bankdeposits 12.2 21.2 8.9
(PATAM)
3. Price indexlinked 56.4 97.9 48.3
Of which: marketable bonds 6.3 10.9 5.0
savings schemes & 18.4 31.9 15.7
tft deposits
pension funds & 31.8 55.1 27.5
life insurance
4.Equityshares 19.8 34.3 33.3
Ofwhich: bank share. 13.0_____22.6_____14.3_____
Total1 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: 1Rest of world omitted, forlack of data,asnotedinsource.
2Source:For 1981, based on Table 8—5A, Bank of Israel Report,
1981, (Hebrew edition), p.254; for 1982, basedonTable 8—5A in
the 1982 Report (Hebrew edition), p.280.
3GNP is fourth quarter GNP, IFS data, transformed to annual rate.
Bankshares are noted separately because their stable real rate




















































































liabilities corresponding to most of the non—equity financial assets
owned by the private sector. Thu reserve requirement for the banks
against foreign currency linked deposits is 90%; and the indexation
provided by private institutions is basedontheir holdings of
government indexed liabilities. Thus the government's daninance in the
allocation of resources extends to the capital markets; indeed, most
private investment is financed with government assistance.
Wage iudexatioa is included as partof thecontract negotiated
between the Histadrut (trade union organization) and the Manufacturers'
Association. Theseagreements,typically biennial, cover most of the
labor force. The frequency anddetailsof cost of living adjustments
have varied over the years. Currently theadjustmentsare madeevery
three months, with compensationforinflation varying with the
inflation rate. For instance, if the quarterly inflation rateisless
than20%, there is 80% compen.tion forinflation; if the inflation
rateis more than 30%, compensation is 90%. It is also agreed that
ther: will be nego1tions between the Histadrut and the umployers if
the real wage falls.8
The Activities and Financing of Government: The government budget
deficit reported in Table 3 for the years 1978—1982 is thetotal
deficiton both internal and external account, as recorded in the IMF
data,for fiscal years. Table 6's more detailed budget data for
calendar year 1981 present a fuller description of the scope of
governmentactivity in the economy.9
Note first that government purchases of goods and services, lines
(1+12) amount to 44% of ON]?. The 44% includes 27% in defense spending,




1. Purchases ofgoodsand services1 32.4
2. Transfer payments2 20.0
3. Subsidies 8.3
4. Direct subsidization of credit3 2.5
5. Totaldomestic expenditure 63.2
6. Taxes 45.0
7.Property and entrepreneurielincomeof public
sector 3.2
8. Total domstic receipts 48.2
9. Domesticdef icit 15.0
10. Subsidy component ofcredilt' 6.6
11. Inflationary erosion ofmoneybase 0.8
II. Foreign
12. Net purchases abro&P 11.9
13. Foreign incc*ii 7.5
Of which:U.S. government grants 6.6
14. Foreign deficit 4.4
15.Totaldeficit .19.4
Source:Banicof IsraelAnnualReport,1931 (Hebrew edition),
pp.101,104.4b
Table 6 continued
Notes:1 Includes domestic defense spending equal to 15% of GNP.
2Transfer payments include explicit interest payments: nominal
interest on nominal bonds and real portion of interest on
indexed bonds. Interest payments are close to 15% of (P.
Transfers arenetof compulsory loan redemptions.
Actual disbursements.
Calculated by Bank ofIsrael,as difference between nominal
interestpaid by borrowers and interest that would be paid at
real rate of 4%.
5This is iinly defense spending. Note that total government
pirc'iases of goods nd services, (l+12)447 01 GNP, is well
above the 33% recorded as government consumption in Table 1.
The difference is accounted for by government investment
activities, and by the fact that government consumption in
1.981 s 39.1% of GNP.
6 Transfers to the national institutions, such as the Jewish
Agency, equal to 2.1% of GNP, not recorded as foreign income
of the government.5
Subsidies recorded in line 3 are for the purchase of goods and
services.
In addition, the government provides extensive subsidies to
borrowers, scrne recorded in line 4. However, the major subsidization
of credit has occurred through the provision of low nominalinterest
loans; the Bank calculates the subsidy element in such credit during
1981at nearly 7% of GNP. Thisamountis noted in Table6, butnot
includedin any of the budget totals. The provision of low nominal
interest rate credit since 1979 has been in the process of being phased
out and replacedby indexedloans.11
The government finances its activities mostly through taxation.
The largest revenue generators are the income tax and value added tax,
which in 1981 raised 18.1% and 5.2% of GNP respectively. National
insurance payments in 1981 were 7.7%ofGNP. There is an impressive
arrayofother taxes. In addition, as Table 6 shows, U.S. government
grants provide a substantialproportion ofthe financing for government
spending.
At this point, the logical step is to explain how the deficit of
19.4% of GNP in Table 6 was financed in 1981, through external
borrowing, domestic borrowing in the form of both price level and
exchange rate linked assets, and the creation ofhigh—powered money.
Regrettablydata difficulties now become significant. The IMF presents
the data contained in Table 7a, for fiscal year 1981/2, which begins
April 1. The deficit before foreign grants in that period was nearly
23% of GNP. Foreign grants and loans financedmorethan half of that
amount.Domestic borrowing amounted to 10% of GNP, a large jrt of
thatfromthe Bank of Israel. The difference between entries 7 and 85a
Table 7a: Financing of_Government Deficit, Fiscal Year 1980
(%ofGNP)
1.Government expenditure and net lending 72.7
2. Budget revenue 49.7
3. Foreign grants 7.6
4. Deficit to be financed 15.3
5.Net foreign borrowingL 5.3
6. Net domestic bond issues2 6.2
7. Net credit from Bank of Israel 3.8
15.3
8. Net impact on base money 6.7
Source: ThIF.
1Equal to loans of 10% of G minus repayments o 4.7% of GNP.
2Equalto bond issues of 9.6%ofGNPminus repayments of 3.4%
ofGNP.6
inthe table is presumably a result in the differences inthe tiinthg
withwhich transactions are recorded by the Treasury and actual
payments. In fiscal year 1981, there was substantial useof Bank of
Israelcredit by the Treasury, more than in most earlier years.
Table 7b presents Bank of Israel data on government finance. The
data are much less clean than those of the IMF. The Bank does not
present a comprehensive table on the financing of the government
deficit,concentrating instead on financing of the domestic component
of the deficit, defined as the deficit that arises from the
government'sactivities in the domestic economy. Ascan be seen, there
is a significant difference between the estimates ofthe domestic
deficitinTables 6 and 7b. Bather than dwell on these difficulties, I
note that it appears that salesofboth bonds and foreign exchange,in
approximately equal amounts, provide most of the financing for the
domestic deficit. Nonetheless, the increase in the money base accounts
for the financing of a significant component of government spending-—
about 2.5% of GNP.12 Eventhough the monetary base in 1931 was under
3.5%ofGNP, large amountsofrevenue canbe raisedat high rates of
inflation13
Part B of Table 7b attempts to account for the foreign component
ofthe deficit. The government sector borrowed heavily abroad, using
theproceeds both to pay for government imports and to sell to domestic
residents. In this account toothereremains a sizeable discrepancy,
part of which may result from capital gains on the Bank of Israel's
holdings of foreign reserves. Adding parts A and B of Table 7b, we
find the general outlines confirm those of Table 7a, which applies to
fiscal year 1981. In both Table 7a and 7b it appears that foreign and6a
Table7b: Bank of IsraelDataon Financing ofGovernmentDeficit,1981
(%ofGNP)
A.Domestic deficit and financing.
1. Domestic deficit from Table 5 15.0
2. Errors and orniss.Lons 4.8
3. Dorrstic public sectordeficit1'2 10.2
4. Net public sector lending 3.2
13.4
5. Sale of foreign exchange to domestic residents 5.9
6.Sale of debt to private sectora 7.5
13.4
B. Foreign deficit and financing.
7. Foreign deficit from Table 6 4.4
8.Public sector foreign borrowings1 7.1
9.Transfersofforeigncurrency via national
institutions 2.1
10. Increase in reserves 0.6
11.Line 5 5.9
Netforeign currency acquisitions (8+9—10—11)2.7
12. Errors and omissions (including capital gains
onreserves) 1.7
4.4
Source:Bank ofIsraelAnnual Report, 1981 (Hebrew), p.224.
1 Described in source as "Liquidity injection steruing franpublic
sector excess demand. "6b
Table 7b continued
2Lines 3—6 follow the schne used by Shiffer (1982),Table5, p.32.
Line 3 in table is line 1 in source(notedabove); line 4 is sumof
lines 3a and 3b in source.
3calculatedas residual.
4Calculated from1ble7—i, ibid, p.150, lines 4b and 6b, (in dollars)
multiplied by average exchange rate for the year, from IFS data.7
domestic borrowing are of the same order of magnitude.
International Trade: Tables 8 and 9 present details of Israel's
international transactions in 1981. The bulk of imports of goods is
accounted for by intermediate products and by oil. A significant share
ofexports is accountedfor by industrial goods; some of these are
defense—related.The service account is large on both the import and
export side, and is close to being balanced. Note that the balance on
goods and services in 1981 wasjustless than gross investment. It can
be said——though not accurately——that Israel's investment spending is
financed from abroad.
Table 9 examines the financing of the current account deficit and
details of aid. Unilateral transfers, governmental and private, cover
mostofthe deficit on net goods and services account. Unilateral
transfersto the government are American government grants. About half
a billion dollars is received by the national institutions, primarily
the Jewish Agency, as a result of donations by world Jewry. Farther
unijateral transfers fromindi'iiduals aremadetothe private sctor.
German reparations continue at a level of close to a half billion
dollars; these restitution payments are made directly to individuals.
Table 9C contains more detail on U.S. government aid. Before the
1973 war, U.S. aid was small. In 1973, emergency military aid
amounting tomore than 10% of GNPwas provided, and total aid has
remainedat approximately that level since then.More than halfthe
flowof resources from the U.S government in anyoneyear is grants.
Thecolumn"Net Loans" is the sumofnew loans made within the year,
minusinterestand principal payments. This amountisexpected to
















Private transfers (net) 5.0
Official transfers 8.3
Currentaccount —7.1
Source: Bank of Israel Report, 1982.
11n 1982 the 1.lanceongoods and servcies fell to —22.5% of
GNP,despitea reductionof2.6%ofGNPinnet non—civilian
imports.7b
Table 9: Balance ofPayments,1981
($billion)
%ofGNP
A.1. Net goodsandservices —4.4320.4
Privatesector —1.90
Public —2.53
2. Unilateral transfers 2.8913.3
Private sector 1.09
Publicsector 1.80
















C.U.S. Government Aid. ($billions)
(1) (2) (l)+(2)
Direct defenseTotal aid
GrantsLoans Net loans Totalimports as %ofGNP1
1972.07 .33 .17 .24 .49 1.9
1973.82 .37 .30 1.02 1.25 11.4
1975 .97 .84 .61 1.58 1.85 13.5
1978 1.05 .93 .49 1.54 1.62 11.9
1980 1.56 1.37 .70 2.35 1.73 12.1
1981 1.42 .93 .26 1.68 2.23 8.1
Source:A Bankof Israel Annual Report, 1931 (Hebrew), pp.150-151.
B Ihid, p.187.
C Ibid, p.191;1980 English edition, p.212; IFS for exchange
rate.
1Total aid is evaluated in shekels at official exchange rate
and dividedby GNP.8
U.S. government aid is related to purchases of defense equipnent
in the U.S. Aid arid defense imports are of the sameorderof
magnitude, with defense imports typically slightly inexcessof aid.
The exchangerate has since 1977 been on a very dirty 'float. The
Bank of Israel intervenes in the market continuously, and occasionally
attempts to stabilize the inflation rate by causing the exchange rate
to appreciate. The reform of 1977 liberalizedthe capitalaccount,
permitting free capital flows and also the holding of 'foreign assets by
danestic residents.15 Subsequently the authorities have intervened to
affect capital movements. Qe intervention took the form of a tax on
capital imports, imposed in 1979 when domestic tight monetary policy
raised interest races and caused an undesired (by the authorities)
capital inflow.
Monetary Policy: Monetary policy in Israel is constrained by two
factors: first, real interest rates on index bonds are inflexible and
determined legislatively; and second, political pressures make it
difficult to allow the real exchange rate to move freely. Neither
constraint is absolute. First, it is only the yield on new bonds that
is fixed by legislation, and the Bank of Israel can intervene in the
secondarymarket to attempt to move the yield on bonds. Inpractice
itsinterventions are directed chiefly to stabilizing the price of
bonds. Second, the real exchange rate is sometimes allowed to
change 16
Giventhe constraints under which it works, theBank has not in
therecent inflationary period pursued money growth targets. It has
pursued credit targets, by limiting the amount of credit banks can
providetheir customers. Strict credit targets and controls were in9
effect in 1979. At that time the targets were partially specified in
Israelicurrency terms, and partially in foreigncurrency. This meant
thenominal targets adjusted automatically for exchange rate changes.
But this was not the major hole in the credit constraint; it was
instead the availability of subsidized export credits. Up to the time
ofthe' 1979credit freeze and squeeze, the export credits had not been
fullyutilized. Once the credit controls cameintoeffect, exporters
tookthefull amountofexport credit to which they were entitled, and
provided tradecredit totheircustomers. The private sector thus
began to find ways around the Bank's credit constraints, as it
typically does. Nonetheless,the 1979—80 period of restraint did
significantlyreduce the balance of payments deficit.
The Governor of the Bank of Israel is described by the law as the
government's economic adviser, but there is no evidencethat the advice
thathas been offered——which is typically to got the budget deficit
under control—-has been taken. The initiative for economic policy is
with the Finance Minister, and the Bank has attempted to ru'i a
restrictive policy only when the Finance Minister has so desired. This
has been infrequently.
The Goals of Policy: Israeli policyinakers have generally given
firstpriority to reducingthe balance of payments deficit. Cbncern
overinflation has mounted in recent years, but has not been sufficient
to induce tough anti—inflationary policies. There were in the 1970's
two major episodes of contractionary policy, in 1975—76 and 1979—80,
each of which was aimed mainly at the balance of payments deficit, but
with the implied effects on the inflation rate clearly being welcome.
In both cases there wasasignificant reduction in the balance of10
paymentsdeficit, but less effect on the inflation rate.
The liberalization of foreign exchange holdings in 1977 was
followed a year later by the transition to triple digit inflation. The
role, if any, of the liberalization in the increase in the inflation
rate will be discussed below.
The most ambitious attempt to reduce the paymentsdeficitand the
inflation rate was undertaken in 1979 by a newly appointed finance
minister, whodirectedhiseffortsat reducing the budget deficit,
partlythrough freezing government employment and partly through
removing purchase subsidies. At the same time, the Bank of Israel was
to constrain credit growth. The policy began to work by increasing
unemployment in early 1980, the balance of payments deficit narrowed,
but there was no quick impact on the inflation rate. The restrictive
policies were extremely unpopular, and with an election expected, the
finance minister was replaced by the present minister.
The new minister argued that supply side policies would reduce the
inflation rate, and claimed to iiçlementthemby reducing import
tariffs and increasing subsidies. In the judnentofpolitical
observers, the policies were successful at turning around an election
that had seemed lost by the government. There has been no subsequent
sign that the government is willing or interested in reducing inflation
if there is a price-—in terms of forgone output—-to be paid.
The prolonged periodsinceQtober 1982 during which the real
exchange rate has been appreciating as part of an anti—inflationary
policyis unusualin that the balance of payments goal of policy has
beensacrificed to the inflation goal. The preference for attempting
tostabilize inflation by manipulating the exchange rate without11
pursuing other contractionary policies reflects thegeneral
unwillingnessof policy—makers in the period since1973 to stabilize
the inflation rate by reducing aggregate demand and causing
unemployment.
Model
In this section I outline a descriptive model of the Israeli
economy based on the post—1977 strucutre of the financial system, that
I believe captures the main mechanLsn in the operation of the economy.
The model is presented both as an attempt to provide a concise
description of the economy, and because it is used in Section III to
guide the discussion of the causes of the current inflation and
pcsuible methods o1reducingthe inflation rate.
The Structure of the Model.
The Assets I&.rkets: There are four assets: money; domestic price
level (CPI) indexed bonds; foreign currency denominated securities; and
equity claims to the returns on physical capital. Money is denominated
in shekels and pays no interest. In the model v assume all money is a
government liability; we thus omit inside shekel-denominated
deposits.17Index bonds are liabilities of the government. We assume
linkage is 100%, although formally some bonds have less than complete
linkage.18 1iysical capital (or the equity claims on capital's
returns) is assumed to be a perfect portfolio substitute for index
bonds.19
Israeliresidents may hold both foreign securities and
domesticallyissued exchange rate linked securities. In form, the
latterare bank liabilities but because the reserve requirement against
such deposits is 90%, v, treat them as a liability of the government.12
The governr13nt pays interest on the reservesheld against the foreign
currency linked securities.
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The appendix lists symbols in the orderin which they appear.
Equations (1) througi (3) are suppi equalsden.nd conditions for
the real rney stock, real assets (bonds plus capital)and foreign
assets respectively. The stock budget constraint ensuresthat the
three equations are linearly dependent. Theassets are assumed to be
gross substitutes•2I13
Anincrease in output increases the demand for money for
transactions purposes and therefore must, bythestock budget
constraint,reduce the demand for at least one of the other assets.
Since foreign—currency linked deixsits are sneLiiiiesused asmediumof
exchange, we assume that the demanJ for bonds and capital falls when
the level of output rises, sthile the effect on the demand for foreign
currency linked securities of a rise in output is allowed to be either
positive or negative. The demand for each asset increases with
wealth.
Fquatton(4)states that the expected real yield on capital is
equalto the real yield onindex bonds. This condition reflects the
assumptionthat the twoassetsareperfectportfolio substitutes.The
marginalproduct of capital is assumed to decrease withthe capital
stockand increase with the level of output.
The Goods Market: There is a single domestically produced good,
with aggregate supply function:
=
(pt,wt,etP;Kt); 3<O (4>O (6)
The supply function is homogeneous of degree zero in p, w, and ep.
Aggregate demandfordomestically produced goods is:
y
etpt
Kt, G,T);l>0, l>>0, (3>0 4>O1 (7)
(1)5>01 (j,)O, (1)7<0.
Realexchange rate depreciation increases the demandfordomestically
produced goods. So does an increase in q, which increases investment
demand.22 For any given q, investment demand increases with the
capital stock, so that increases in K increase aggregate demand given14
weal.th.23 Finally, f:Lscal.policy, asmeasuredby government spending
on domestically produced goodsand services, and taxes (not of
transfers) affect aggregate demand fordanestic goods.
WageSettiag:Therate of increaseof the nominal wage is in part
determinedby indexation, with past inflationratesdeterminingpresent
rates of nominal wageincrease.In addition, therateofwage increase
is affected by expectations of inflationanddeviationsof output fran









The term following the coefficient a1 representsthe effects of
indexing: actual past inflation affectstoday's rate of wage increase.
So too does anticipated inflation, to anextent that depends on how
much compensation will occur throughindexation. Indexed wage
adjustments in practice take p!.ace everythree months.
The third term on the right hand side representsthe pressure of
demand on the wage. When output is expectedto be above the full
employment level, y*, wages rise more rapidly.
When there has been unanticipated inflationin the past, with the
coefficient a1 less than unity, some catch-upof real wages will ocur.
These catch—ups occur mainly at the bargainingover base wages between
the Histadrut (Labor Federation) and the employers.We represent them15
in themodel byincludinga term in ((w/p)*(w/p)), the difference
betweentheequilibrium or fullemploymentreal wage and the actual
real wage. The catch—up term nkesitmore difficult for accelerating
inflation permanently to reducethereal wage. There is accordingly
rocinfor real wages to be affected bythe dynamics of the inflation
process.Because this last term adjusts the wage on the basis of the
difference between actualand full employment wages, itdoes not
represent "real wage resistance," a phencinemon which could be added.
Equation(8)is of course a Phillips curve.
TheGovernment Budget Constraint: The government purchasesgoods
both athoneandabrcyad, and finances itself by taxation, money issue,
domestic security issues, foreign borrowing,and foreignaid. The
government budget constraint is:
M÷1—M. B1.. 1 e. e
+-"+ — (F÷—RSt÷j)+FA (9) P Pt
e B e
=G-T+GF+(l+rB)t +--(l+rF )(dj) tt Pt t t—1 p_ p
t—1tt
The assumption made in ())::the timing of transactions is that,
forexample,new indexed debt that will becometheinitial stock of
debtnext period (Bt÷i) is sold in the current period at the current
price level. The right hand side includes interest payments on the
debt and on foreign borrowing. The fact that the debt is indexed ny
be seen by noting that the real amount paid on the debt,
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Net exports of the private sector minus government imports plus
interest receipts (in practice these are negative) and aid Iran abroad
are equal to the acquisition of foreign assets by the private and
government sectors together. The current account is of course deeply
in deficit, which results in the increasing foreign indebtedness of the
econO1.
Net exports are a function of aggregate demand and the price of




Factor Supplies: The capital stock is given by:
Kt+i =(1—o)Kt
+I(qK) (12)
Ppulation and effective labor force are taken to be exogeneous,
and growing at rate n. This assumption rules out one significant
constraint on policynkers: the belief that any prolonged period of
unemployment would reduce the rate of itmnigration and increase
emigration.17
Short Run Equilibrium
Within each period, beginningof periodstocks, M, Bt, Kt, F,
arid are given. The nominal ge, w, is predetermined. The
interestrate onforeign assets, r, and theforeign price level, p,
are exogeneous to the Israeli ecoriany. In discussing the determination
of short runequilibriumwe take expectations (of the price level,
relative price of capital, and the exchange rate) as given.
TheAssets Markets: Equilibriumin the assets markets canbe
studied using equation (4) and any to of equations (1) —(3).The aim
is to show the asset market equilibrium values of q anti c/p conditional
on values of the price level and output, along with the stock and
expectational variables. We will examinethe proportisof the







Figure 2 shows equilibrium loci for the money (IL)andbonds (BB)
markets. In drawing these loci,thelevel of output, y, is taken to be
constant, as are the other variables in the vector X defined in (15).
Fran equation (4), for given Kt and FK is constant, so thatqand
B tc1t+l r are, fran (4), inversely related given"
and —---i-.
TheIL locus in Figure 2 is negatively sloped because an increase
in q causes an excess demand for real balances through both wealth and18
rateof return effects. The excess demand has to be offset by a
reductionin e/p, reducingrealwealth, to maintainequilibrium. In
thebond—capitalmarket,whose equilibrium is shownbythe BB locus, an
increasein q causes excess supplywhich is offset by an increase in
demandinduced through an increase in the real exchange rate. Also
shown in Figure2is the FF locus (equation (3)), which is positively
slopedand steeper than the BB locus. Asset market equiltbrium obtains
at point E, with corresponding equilibritJn values of the price of
installed capital (and the realinterestrate) andthereal exchange
rate.
Wenowshow graphically howchangesin the price level and the
levelofoutput respectively affect theequilibriumvalucs of q and
e/p.In Figure 3, an increase in the price level creates an excess
demand for real balances, thus shifting the IL curve to the left, to
LW. The increase in the price level creates an excess supplyof
bonds, shifting B8 to the right, to BB'.Clearly, q falls. The
effectson the rea3 exchange rate appearambiguous. However, the real
exchange rate must fall, because both a rise inthe price level and
declinein q create an excess supply of foreign currency denominated
assets, which is removed by a fall in the real exchange rate. Thusthe
new equilibrium at E' shows both q and e/p lower as a result ofthe
rise in the price level.
In Figure 4 we present a similar analysis of the effects of an
increase in the level of output. This simultaneously raises the
transactions demand for money and the marginal product of capital. For
given q, the real interest rate rises. The net effect on the demand
for real balances is ambiguous, but we assume it to be positive.q
1 8a






Figure 3The Effects of an Increase in















Accordingly, the LL curve shifts to the left, to LL'.
In themarket for foreign currency denominated assets, the
increase in output hasanuncertain effect on demand through the
transactions variable, and reduces demand through the rate of return
variable.We assumedemand falls, thus shifting the FF curveinFigure
4 to the left, to FF'. Thereal exchange rate fails. The effecton q
isuncertain. The transactions demand related effects tend to cause
to fal12 while those associated with the increase in the marginal
product of capital tend to cause q to rise. We assume the effect is
typically positive.
























Figure 4 The Effects of an Increase in
Output on Assets Market





Although a change in the stock of bonds has an uncertaineffect on
the realexchange rate that clears the assets markets (4-isof
uncertain sign), an open market purchase (increasing M while reducing
B) increases e/p. In otherwords, expansionary rionetary policy causes
the exchange rate to depreciate. A swap ofdomestic for foreign
currencydenominated bonds, increasing B while reducing F, reduces q
and increases e/p. This open market operation corresponds to
sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market.
Under the assumption that bonds and capital are perfect portfolio
substitutes, an open market swap of bonds for capital can havereal
effects only if the return on capital differs depending on whether it
is held bythe goverrnent or theprivatesector. For instance, if the
governmentbuys capital and takes it out of production, the marginal
productof capital rises. As a result, q rises but the effects on the
real exchange rate are uncertain.
Goods Market Equilibrium: Equilibrium obtains in the goods market
when the output ofdomesticgoods, yfrom(6), .s equaltothe demand
for those goods, yfrom (7).In Figure 5 we show aggregate supply arid
demand curves in (p,y) space.25
The carves shown in Figure 5 have the conventional slopes.
Ibwever, in the case of aggregate supply, there are countervailing





Withbothand h2 negative, the numerator need not be positive. The21
ambiguityarises because an increase inoutputincreases the
transactionsdemand for money, thereby causing a currency appreciation
through the assets markets, and a reduction in production costs. We
assume this effect is not large enough to cause the AS curve to be
negatively sloped.
On the aggregate demand side, all the channels through which an
increase in the price level affect aggregate demand operate in the same
direction: an increase in the price level reduces aggregate demand. We
assun that an increase in output creates an excess supply of goods,
despitesomeambiguities arising from asset market effects of an
increase in output.26
The intersection of the aggregate demandandsupply curves
determines the price level and domestic output. Given expectations,
the foreign interest rate, and the stock variables, the joint
equilibriumoftheassets and goodsmarkets determines the price level
(p) and output (y), the exchange rate (e), the relative price of
installed capital (a),andthe rca'. interest rate (rB).
The exchange rate is accordingly determined by the interaction of
the goods and assets markets, without direct reference to the external
sector. But of course expectations of future exchange rates and the
levels of stocks of foreign assets affect the current exchange rate,so
that there is no useful sense inich itcanbe saidthat the exchange
rate is determined uniquely in the assets markets, or thatitis not
influenced by the current account.
aipara.tive Statics.
We now examine the effects of changes in asset stocks, fiscal
variables, andexpectationson the equilibrium price and output levels.22
We start by considering the impacteffectsof an increase in the money
stock, holding expectations constant.
AnIncrease in the Money Stock: An increase in the money stock
increases both q and e/p in the assets markets. The goodsmarket
effects areshown in Figure 5. The depreciated real exchange rate and
the riseinq both increase aggregate demand, shiftingthe AD curve to
AD'. The higher exchange rate shifts the AS curve to AS'. The price
level and level of output both increase.27
One source of the short run non—neutrality of money is thefact
that thenominal wageis pre—determined. But there is a second source
ofnon—neutrality,which has sofar been concealedby concentrating on
thegoods and assets markets. The government budgetconstraint implies
that a money stock increase has to be accompanied by someotherpolicy
change.28 For instance, the change could be an increase in government
spending, or cut in taxes. In this case, outputandprices would rise
bymore than wouldresultpurely from the increase in the money stock.
An Open Market Purchase: An open mat ket purchase of bDnd3 has the
saii qualitative effects as are shown in Figure 5.Both q ande/prise
in the assets markets, shifting the aggregate demand and supply curves
as shown. Both output andtheprice level rise.
In discussing such an operation, we assume that expectations of
inflation, of the rate of change of the exchange rate, andof the rate
of change of q, do not change. But given the changeinthe composition
of the government debt, expectations will adjust. These effects are
discussed below.
The Effects of an Anticipe.tedDepreciatiOfl An anticipated








Figure5 Goods Market Equilibrium, and










securitiesmore attractive relative to domestic, and tends to reduce q
and increase e/p in the assets markets. Investment demand falls while
the demand for Israeli exports rises. The net effect on aggregate
diandistherefore uncertain. If the export effect dominates, both
thepricelevel and output rise.
The Effects of an Incrase in the Wage Rate:An increase in the
wagerateshifts theaggregate supply curve upand to the right,
raising the price level and reducing output. The relative price of
installed capital, q, probably falls, while the effects on the real
exchange rate are uncertain.
CurrencyLiberalization: The modelling of the currency
liberalization in the current model requires sane care. Foreign
currency denominatedsecurities were traded before the liberalization,
butthere wasnofree access to foreign capital markets. Fo.reii
exchange purchased through this market was typically at a premium over
the official rate. Modelling the operation of such a syste would
reçre the thtrodaction of a new variable, representing the premium
for foreign—currency linked securities over the official exchange
rate29
We do not explicitly model the pre—existing structure of the
capital markets. Rather,we view the currency liberalization as an
increase in the yield available in the capital markets on foreign—
currency denominatedsecurities.Theeffectsofsucha change are
already impliedby (17) and (18): in the capital markets there is an
increasein the real exchange rate (a depreciation) and a fall in q.
The effects on aggregate demand are thus uncertain, since the fall in q
reduces demand while the depreciation increases it. The depreciation24
inaddition shifts uptheaggregate supply curve.
Theabove discussion assumes that assetstocksandexpectations
remainunchanged. In the model with which we are vrking, it is
entirely possible in the short run and ignoring expectations,for both
the exchange rate and q to be kept at desired levels through open
market operations. It ould have been possible through open market
swaps of foreign exchange denominated assetsfor money and bonds for
the government to maintain both q and c/p at their pre—liberalization
levels. Had this been done, there would later have been budgetary
implications resulting from the substitution ofinterest—bearing assets
formoney in the portfolios of the public that wouldhave increased the
inflation rate. Moving over to thegoodsmarkets, the only effectsof
the liberalization in the current periodwould have been a result of
changedexpectationsabout futurebudget deficits or values of q.
Theliberalization thus need not have created any major short—run
disturbances to the economy except——and this is a major exception-—
through expectaions. But the liberalizatio..i a carried outdd affect
the goods markets directly. The liberalization was accompanied bythe
removal of tariffs and export subsidies and by a 50% devaluation that
was intended to maintain the effective exchange ratefixed. Assuming
the effective exchange rate unchanged, the supply curve would not have
shifted as a result of the devaluation. But because there were pre-
existing foreign currency denominated assets, the 50% devaluationhad a
large wealth effect, shifting up the aggregate demand curveand causing
theprice level torise. There was thus an iirnediate expansionary
effectfrom the liberalization—cum--devaluatiofl.
In addition, and not less important, the liberalization by causing25
ashift frito foreign currency denominated securities from domestic
money reduced the domestic currency denominated moneybase and thus
required higher rates of inflation to produce the same amount of
revenue from seigniorage.
The External Sector: The trade account is completely determined
within each period by the level of output and the real exchange rate.
The service account is predetermined. An open market purchase that
causes a depreciation and expansion of output has ambiguouseffects on
the tradeaccount: the real depreciation tends to increase net exports
whilethe rise in domestic income tends to decrease net exports.
A fiscal expansion (not studied above) unambiguously increases the
current account deficit.
Long Run Constraints: Suppose the economy is in a steady state,
with given ratios of real balances to bonds and government issued






where b =— , m-—, ——
pN pN pN
Lowercase letterswithout time subscripts aresteadystate real values
of the equivalent upper case symbols.
Substituting into equations (9) and(10),we obtain the steady
state government budget and balance of payments constraints:
+b(141t)(n_rB)+(fd_rS)[(if)(flITf)1+fa (22)
=g— +gf26
where is per capita real government revenue from taxes net of
transfers
Thebalance of payments constraint is:
fa+nx=g+(f±rs)(1t1)(n—rr) (23)
The crucial pointaboutthese constraints-—arid a well—kriowa one——
is that the amountofseigniorage and the possibility of issuing other
assets to finance a budgetdeficit(in (22))dependssignificantly on
thegrowth rate of the economy. In a rapidly growing economy, the
government can finance a budget deficit through the printing of money
without creating inflation. When the growth rate is lower, it takes a
higher inflation rate, if indeed the budget deficit can be financed at
all31
Similarly,the relationship between the growth rate of output and
thereal interest rate is an important detetinant of whether a deficit
in either the government's account or the foreign trade sector can be
financed through borrowing against bonds or foreign exchange. If
growthis rapid——as itwas in Israel up to 1972——there is no difficulty
inhaving large budget deficits financed by householdswantingto
acquire assets that will maintain the asset to income ratio constant.
But when growth is slow andtheinterest rate above the growth rate,
borrowing generates ever increasing burdens on the budget over time.
Inflationary Issues.
Inthis section we briefly analyze issues of general interest that
arise from the Israeli inflationary experience.
TheInflation_Tax.
Table 10 presents data on the amount of revenue obtained by the
Israeligovernment through the creation of high powered money. The26 a
Table10: Money Base andSeigniOrage
p (%) IIea1GNP growLhInflation
(,p.a.) rate (CPI)
1955—59 12.7 10.3 5.3 2.1
1960—64 13.0 9.5 6.1 2.1
1965—69 13.0 8.5 4.3 1.3
1970—74 15.4 8.4 17.6 3.5
1975—76 11.0 2.3 35.4 2.6
1977—78 9.9 3.3 42.3 1.4
1979—80 4.7 3.3 103.0 18
1981 4.0 2.5 116.6 2.1
Source: IFS data.
Table 11: Estimated_Inflation Tax on MonetaryBase and Credit Subsidy
--
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3)—(4)
Monetary base Tax Tax Credit subsidy1 Total
(billions of rate As % dueto inflation Inflation
1982 shekels) of GNP (%ofGNP) tax
1976 49.0 .29 2.6 9.8 —7.0
1979 35.4 .66 3.4 11.3 —7.8
1981 17.7 .76 1.7 5.1 —3.3
1Calculatedasdifference betweenrealinterest paidand amount that
wouldbepaidat real rate of 4% on long term credit. Fordetails on
calculation of subsidy on short—term credit, see source.
-
Source:BankofIsrael Annual Report, 1982 (Hebrew edition), p.244.27
periodduringwhich seigniorage revenue wasat a n.ximum was1970-1974,
when theeconany was groririg fast (at least into 1973), and when the
inflation rate was, by later standards, low. The ratio of high powered
money to income was duringthatperiod at about 12%, roughly the ratio
that was maintained from 1955 until the implementation of the
liberalization in 1977. Table 10 shows a sharp reduction in the ratio
of monetary base to income-—which is the base of the inflation tax——
starting in 1979. This shift followed the liberalization with a lag.
The lag is probably a reflection of the fact that it took time until
foreign currency deposits began to beused as means ofparnent, thereby
producingthe shift out ofdomestic currency.
Isit possible that the current amount of seigniorage—about 2% of
GNP—could be obtained at a lower inflation rate? In other words, is
the economy on the slippery side of the laffer curve? That obviously
depends on the inflation elasticity of the demand for the monetary
base. If the ratio of base to incatreturnedto 10%, then an
in'1..tion of about :'.7% (plus 3% for growth) would generate revenue
equalto 2% of GNP.
There are two ways of producing such a shift. First, it could
happen if the inflation rate were reduced in the current post-
liberalizationinstitutional setting. That wouldrequire a very large
elasticityofthe monetary base withrespectto inflation-—an
elasticity that isnot at all visible in the data in Table 10 for the
pre-reformyears.
Second, such a shift could beinduced by undoing the currency
liberalization.The demand function for high powered moneycouldbe
shifted by policy measures, suchasthat recently implemented that28
imposes a tax on the purchase offoreigncurrency. Even so, because
financial sophisticationhas increased rapidly since 1977, it is
doubtfulthat the systemwouldreturn to a basetoincome ratio of 10%,
nearly double the current U.S. ratio.
Thus a reduction in the inflation rate would haveto be
accompanied by a reduced reliance on seigniorage by the government.
Is the Inflation Tax Negative? It is often asserted that the
inflation taxinIsrael is negative. Table 11 shows the calculation:
the tax on the holdings of monetary base is more than offset for the
private sector by the fall in the value of its nominal liabilities to
the government. The point made by the table is that a marginal 1% of
inflation increases private sector wealth. The effect was at a maximum
in 1979 and is gradually becoming less important as the government
stops providing non—indexed loans to the private sector.
Table 11 shows that the real balance effect would be negative in
Israel. That is, if economic agents regard their liabilities to the
government as liabilities, then their wealth wou increase wh€n the
price level increases. It does not necessarily follow that an increase
in the money stock would produce negative revenue for the government.32
An increase of one shekel in the money stock would in the first
instance provide one shekel's worth of resources to the government.
The subsequent negative effects, suimnarized in Table 11, would have to
be deducted from the initial positive effect. But it does appear from
thetable thatthe effect through subsidized credit is so large—or was
so large untilrecently——thatan increase in the money stock would have
reduced the present discounted value of government revenue.
Thisof coursebrings to the fore the basic question about the29
Israeli.inflation: whydoesthe government persist in policies that
produce such high rates of inflation? With nothing obviously gained by
continuing inflation, why not stop it? We return to this question
below.
The Balance of Payments and the Foreign Debt.
Thebalance ofpayments hasbeen themajor preoccupationof
Israeli policymakers for the past three decades. Figure 6 and Table 12
show net exports for the period since The foreign deficit has
been in the range of 20% of GNP for most of the period, withasharp
increase taking place following the Ycn Kippur Warandassociatedoil
shock.
As noted by i.rni(1979), there are twostandardargurients for the
case that the large import surplus is undesirable. The first is that
the accompanying accumulation of foreign debt places an undue burden on
future generations. The second is that the magnitude of the deficit
and the need to rely on external financing, some of it in the fona of
grants, makes or excessive vulnerability to outside pressure, economic
and political.
Table 13 presents data on the extent of the external debt. The
gross debt passed the $20 billion mark in the third quarter of 1982.
The net debt at the end of 1982 was equal to 63% of GNP or 1.4 times
the value of exports. With a real interest rate of 5%, the annual
interest cost of the debt would be above 3.0% of GNP. This wouldbe a
manageableamount in steady state. But the ratio of the net foreign
debt to GNP is growing because of the sizeofcurrent account deficits
financed through borrowing. By the end of 1982 net debt service


















wheree is Sexchangerate, p* is U.S. price
and p is Israeli price level (GD? def1aor).
There was extensive licensing of iciports in the period to 1954.









1. Gross external debt
2. Net external debt
3. Net debt as %ofGNP
4. Net debt as %ofexports
Source: IMF.
1975 1979 1981 1982
10.2 16.4 24.2 25.2
6.7 11.1 13.1 13.7
57.1 66.4 63.1 62.930
Isthe accumulation of the debt desirable, or at least bet Ler than
the alternatives?3 Noteficstthatpartof the import surplus of the
lasteight years has been associated with defense imports. Figure 6
includes data on defense imports, which show that most of the
significant increase in the import surplus in the mid—7OTs was defense
related (the rest was oil). Borrowing would be optimal if the current
defense burden were transitory. But if the current rate of defense
spending were to continue, it would become necessary to curtail
borrowing
Theconcern over vulnerability to foreign pressure resulting from
the import surplus and the magnitude of the foreign debt is a real one.
Itis also a very old concern. (See Halevi and Kiinov—Malul (1968)).
Such pressures have beenbroughtto bearin the past, though the abrupt
cut—off of aid that has been the primary fear of policymakers has not
happened. If it were to happen, the access of the Israeli government
and private sector to international capital markets would be curtailed;
there would be major disruption o the economy anc a reduction in the
standard of living.
At least for this reason, successive Israeli governments have
sought to bring about a reduction of the import surplus.36 The level
of exports has risen rapidly relative to GNP, as Figure 6 and Thble 12
show. The economy succeeded in moving resources into the export sctor
through a variety of incentives, including subsidized export credits,
and recently, exchange rate insurance. Although the level of Imports
has risen along with exports, and the basic 20% of GNP import surplus
renains, the private sector import surplus has been reduced—defense





































































































































The Israeli government has three times undertaken major
restrictive policies to reduce the balance of payments deficit. The
first period was 1965—67, which shows in Figure 6 as having the lowest
import surplusof the entire period. After the 1973war, therewas
againa periodinwhich taxes were raised andthe balance of payments
deficitwasreduced.The latter episode tookplaceagainst a
background of highinflation. Sodid the attempted 1979—80 program to
reduce the payments deficit through restrictive fiscal andcredit
policy.In each case there wasareduction in the payments deficit, at
the cost of higher unemployment. The conclusion, especially after the
painful 1965—67 episode, was that itwas preferableto attempt to
improve the balance of payments gradually, excep in extreme
circimstances like those after 1973 when the importsurplusmovedclose
to 40% of GNP.
It hasgenerally been believed that to achieve its eventual aim of
a substantially reducedcurrentaccount deficit, the government will
haveto produce a cant Lnuing slow real devaluatiofl. ihether a real
devaluation is needed, though, depends on relative productivity trends
in Israel and abroad. It appears from Table 12 that the government has
had some success in achieving a real devaluation over the years,
althoughthe datashould be treatedwithextremecaution; in any event,
thesuccess of the policy can also be gauged by its effects on the'
volume of exports and the import surplus. Taking defense imports into
account, this aspect of policy has been successful.
The 1982—83 policythat attempts to stabilize the inflation rate
by causing a real appreciation has, however, sharply increased the
balance of paymentsdeficit and foreign borrowing. This policy is32
undoingthe reduction in the external deficit that waspainfully
achieved during the past decade. With an external deficitin excess of
$4billion per year,projected by someestimatesto rise farther in
1983,the prospects for a rising and ultiately unsustainableexternal
debt burden become high. For this reason •the current policywill be
reversed.
Inflation and Other Trends in the Israeli Economy.
•..
Theeconomy described in the first part; ofthis paper is very
different from the Israeli economy in, say, 1960. In that year
government expenditure was less than 30% of GNP,thegovernment budget
deficit (IFS definition), was 4%ofGNP the CPI was 2% higher than in
the previous year; only the import surplus, at 18% of GNP, wasat a
modern level. It was the import surplus that was the radn causeof the
restrictive fiscal and monetary policies that produced the1966—67
recession, which as we have seen in Figure 6 did improvethe current
account. The question is, what happened after 160?
Table 14 'esents sum.r data for the behavior of the major
macroeconomic variables over subperiods since 1958, and Figure7 shows
some of the same variables graphically. The period upto 1967 looks
tranquilfran today's perspective. Growth wasrapid, inflation low,
andgovernment spending and the budget deficit low.After the 1967 war
therewasanapparently permanent jump in the level of government
spending, due largely but not entirely to higherdefense spending. For
the next four years the economygrew rapidly, absorbing labor from the
adntinistered territories and irrmigration. (Bruno, 1983). The increase
in the labor force permitted rapid growth without pressure onthe real































































































































































8.5 32.21 28.0 4.2 10.6
11.1 47.1 32.2 14.9 21.8
2.7 64.2 42.5 21.7 30.0
1.8 61.3 45.3 16.0 25.2
1to 6;Bank of Israel AnnualReport,1981








are ratios offiscalyear (starting April 1)governmentvariables
to calendar year GNP.
2Q)lw1J1s4 through6 in this row are for 1978—80..33
rate,which reached 20% even before the Yom Kippur War.
Thenin 1973 the oil and war shocks struck. Defense spending
jumped by nearly 10% of GNP once again. The supply shock both reduced
thegrowth rate ofoutput and caused a rapid rise in the inflation rate
in1974. Inthat year the government made a deal with the Histadrut to
forgoone round ofindexation of wages, which madeit possible to
reduce the real wage and appeared to start the inflation rate back down
towards the 20% level frau which it had ccwin1972. Taxes were
raised andcreditrestricted to reduce thebalanceof payments deficit
andinflation. Fran 1973 to 1977, GNPgrewslowly. Productivity
growthwasnegative in each ofthe years 1975-1977. The balance of
jayments deficit didfall.
The highlevels ofgoverrunent (especially defense) spending and
money growth continued. The inflation rate caine down frcn its1974
level, but appeared to stabilize at about 30% just as it currently
appears tobe stable at a higher rate. The government wastaking about
3%of GNP in seigniorage, less than it hadtakenin the three years
before 1973. But as shown above, with the low real growth rate, a
higher inflation rate wasnecessaryto produce the saine amount of
seigniorage. Recall at this point that the real interest rate was kept
fixed,sothat any amount of the deficit that could not be covered
throughbond sales at the existing interest rate autcxnatically fed into
eitheran increase in the stock of high powered money, or the foreign
deficit. Indexation made the inflation tolerable, and there was no
willingness to pay the price in terms ofunemployment to reduce the
inflation rate significantly.
Then came the liberalization of 1977. As noted above, the34
liberalization wasaccompanied bya devaluation that produced awealth
effectin the goods market, thereby raisingthe price level and thus in
the short run the inflation rate. With a lag,the liberalization also
produced a shift in the demand forshekel denominated currency. The
initialreaction wasto move largely from index bonds to foreign
currencylinked deposits,thus not yet shifting the demand forlocal
currency denominated money. It wasonlygradually that it was
understoodthat the foreign currency balances couldbe used to make
transactions,and the demand for shekel denominated assetstherefore
shifted. Accordingly we see in Figure 7 thatit is only in 1979 that
thereis a large increase in the inflation rate,accompaniedby a fall
inthe growth rate of the moneystock.Subsequently there is againa
reasonablyclose correspondence between the inflationrate and the
growthofMl.
Because the jump in the inflation rate cameat a time whenthe
growth rate of Ml wasnothigh,there has beena tendency in Israel to
describe the inflation as being caused by a"bubble", meaning that it
is due to unemplained sources rather than monetary pressures.But
given the shift in the demand forshekel denominated assets, the
inflation rate would at somepointhave had to exceed the growth rate
of money.
But whythenhas the inflation rate not come downsubsequently?
Therehas not beenareduction in the growth rateofthe nominal
aggregates since the inflation rate brokethrough the triple digit
range by the end of 1979. At onelevel this failure to reduce the
growth rate of nxiinal money may beattributed to the need for revenue
from seigniorage. But because during this periodgovernmentrevenue35
frominflation was probably negative in the sense definedatthe
beginning of this section (see Table 10), the inflation hasalsoto be
blamedon a set ofoperating procedures (a constant real interest rate,
reasonablyconstant real wages, exchange rate targets) that made the
rate of growth of money endogeneous. From this viewpoint, the
continued rapid inflation can be blamed rather on the government's
failureto reduce its budget deficit. Thelarge government deficit
ensuresthatafter all other sources offinancing of the deficit have
beentapped (foreign and domestic borrowing), the residual is financed
by the printing of money.
Along with thehigher inflation since1973, the Israeli economy
hasalso experienced much slor growth than before. Part of the
decline in the growth rate is a result of slower accumulation of
factors of production (Bruno, 1983) and part a result of a fall in
productivity growth. The heavy pressure of defense and government
spending has resulted in a reduction in investment spending, and the
labor force hui be growing slowly. But productivity growth has
fallen more rapidly in Israel than in other countries. The reason for
this is not clear, though doubtless some blame attaches to the high
inflationthathas moved resources into the financial sector.37
Stabilization Policy: The model presented above indicated that
there is nothing particularly mysterious about the operation of either
monetary or fiscal policy in a heavily indexed economy like the Israeli
one, with its unusual menu of assets. Restrictive monetary orfiscal
policywill reduce the price level or inflation rate. Butthey will
alsoreducethe level of output.
Theindexation formulae for wages do not provide instant price36
flexibility.There is a lag in the adjustment ofwages,which means
that the real wage would be high during the courseofa disinflation.
The one wayoutof this dilerrnia is an agreement with the Histadruton a
wage and macro—policypackage. Such an agreement wassuccessfully
reached with the government in 1974, when it wasnecessaryto havea
realdevaluation and labor waspersuaded toforgo indexation
temporarily. In the absence of such an agreement, it will takethe
pressure of unemployment to drive down therate of wage increase and
thusthe rate of price increase. Israeli governments have not since
thesixties shown evidence that they arewilling to have prolonged
unemployment. Thechoice is thus between a package, and attempts to
disinflate gradually. In either case, the government would have to
reduceits domestic deficit, to be sure that itwould not endup again
relying on money printing to finance the deficit.
The government has experimented with the alternative of trying to
reduce the inflation rate by keeping the prices of coTnodities or the
exchaigerate stable.Such policies havenot worked.Fixing othe
exchange rate for a period during which domestic inflationis
continuing only ensuresthat abig correction has to take place later.
Similarly, the attempt to use subsidies to stabilize scme nominal
prices leads to large increases in the budget deficit, and eventually
to the lifting of the subsidies and more inflationary pressure.
There is one final question. The inflation rate is not a major
issue in Israel. It is talked about, but there is no grounds1l of
publicinsistence that the rate be reduced. Indexation of pensions,
long term savings, and wages, cover most of the difficulties thatwould
face an unsophisticated economic agent living in an economy with a high37
and variable rate of inflation. The question is: why disinf late?
Israeli policyinakers frequently assert that unemployment that would be
neededtodisinf late successfully cannot be justified in Israel. The
1965—67recessionduring %thich unemployment reached double digits and
there as net emigration has burned as deep a concern about
unemployment in the memory of policymakers and the public as theGreat
Depression did in the United States.
The arguments for undergoing the .in of disinflation have not
beenestablished. It hasfrequently been asserted that the low growth
ofthe seventies in Israel is a result of the high and variable
inflation, which draws resources into non—productive activities like
banking, and which distorts the price mechani. But the productivity
slowdownis a worldwide phenanenon, which has take.a place in low
inflation as 1l as high inflation countries. A convincing
demonstration that it is indeed the inflation that is responsible for
low growth would make the case for disinflation.38
Footnotes
1Unlessotherwise noted, data are from International_Financial
Statistics or the IFS tape.
2Kravis, lleston and Surrners (1978) present estimates of Israeli per
capita GDP adjusted for purchasing power differences that are around
60% of the United States level for the years 1970, 1973, and 1974.
The exchange rate mediated comparison for those three years ranged
from 40% to 60%.
A similar table is presented in Shiffer (1982); his data differ
slightlyfrom those in Table 1, apparently as a result of data
revisions.
Berglas (1983).
5For accounts of Israeli indexation see Brenner and Patinkin (1977)
and Kleiman (1977).
6In1982 thebanks were encouraged to offer high nominal interest rate
time deposit accounts to increase the dnand for nominal assets. At
the name time, the tax treatment of nominal interest was adjusted to
ensure only real interest s taxed. Accordingly the share of non-4ft
nominal assets rose from 1.3% to 2% of financial assets. In April
1.983a 1% taxwas imposed on the turnover of foreign currency linked
assets, also with the aim of increasing the dnand for shekel
denominated assets.
7Totalnet wealth ofthe non—financial private sector for the end of
1981 was estimated by the Bank ofIsrael to be a little above 4 times
GNP(Bank of Israel Annual Report, 1981, Hebrew edition, p.257): the
housing stock and value of plant and equipnent account for most of the
excess of net wealth over financial wealth as recorded in Table 5.39
8The less than 100% compensation for inflation wasintroducedon the
grounds that nominal wages should not be adjusted in response to
external shocks.The lackof full indexation hasled tocontinuing
attempts by labor to restore real wages in mid—contract, and thus to
increasedlaborstrife. SomeIsraeli economists now argue that wage
indexation should be complete, frequent, and put in place as soon as
possible following each change in prices——on the grounds both that
thiswould ininiinize labor trouble andthat it wouldhelp the
disinflation process.
I am indebted to Zvi Auerbach for his assistance in compiling Table 6
and to Zalman Shiffer for advice on Table 7.
10The Bank of Israel data differ in several respects from those of the
IMF, which are based on Treasury calculations. The two sets of data
are difficult to reconcile, in part because Bank data are typically
for calendar years and Treasury data for fiscal years. The underlying
sources ofthe difficulties appear to bethe use by the Bank of a cash
basisfor expenditures and receipts as compared¶itha less clear set
of Treasuryconventionson the timing ofexpenditures and receipts;
and a wider definition of the government sector by the Bank.
11The estimate for 1982 is 5.1% of GNP; the peak, in 1979, was 11.3%
of GNP.
12The widedefinitionof the base is used in Table7b.Continuingthe
discussionfran footnote 10, it is believed that the errors and
anissions recorded in line 2 of Table 7b, which is based on monetary
data as opposedto the budgetary data that underlie Table 5, result
from:the difference between accrual (Table 6) and cash (Table 7b)
accounting;from thetreatment of interest; and perhaps from the40
treatmentof government support of housing investment. The difference
is unusuallylargein 1981.
13During 1981 the change inthe money base amountedto 2.4% of GNP
(calculated fran Bank of Israel Report, 1981(Hebrew) p.251). However,
since Bank of Israel profits are included in government revenue,this
item is not shown separately in Table 7b.
14 It hasbeenengagedin suchan exercise since tober 1982, with the
result that the real exchange rate hasappreciatedover 30%, withno
visible effect on the inflation rate. A large devaluationis expected
asof the time of writing (July 1983).
15 For a description and evaluation of the reform, see Sussan
(1979).
16SeeFischer(1981) for a discussion ofmonetary policy in
Israel.
17 In 1973theratio ofmonetarybase toMlwas93%; at the endof 1981
the ratio was78%. The ratio of reserve money to GNP (expressed at an
annual rate) yns 3 2% n the fourth quarterof1981.The eQlivalent
ratio forthe United States was 5.5% in 1982.
18A bond with return that is 80% index linked can, at high rates of
inflation, be viewed as a fully linked bond paying realinterest at a
rate equal to 80% of the stated real rate.
19Given that the Israeli tax system is more inflation proof thanthe
U.S. systn this assumption is more appropriate for Israel thanit
would be for the U.S. There were nonetheless until 1981—2 rJor
inflation—related distortions in the Israeli tax system.
20The asset menu and equilibrium conditions in this rn1e1 are similar
to those in the valuable paperbyFraenkel (1979).41
21An alternative formulation wouldhave thereal returnson each
asset,measuredin CPI units,in the demand functions. The present
formulation is a specializedversionof that form.
22Ithas been suggested that because governmentintervention in the
investment process is so pervasive, it might be preferable to treat
investhtent as exogenous.
23This argument is based on an adjustment (of capital) cost function of
theform K.C(I/K) where I isthe rate of investment.
This can be seenmore clearly by adding theBB curve to the figure.
25These curves embody the assumption of asset market clearing, since
the functions q( )andh( ),(13)and (14), are used to substitute for
q and e/p wherever they appear in (6) and (7).
26Theseambiguities arise only becausean increase in output is
assumed to increase q, thereby increasing demand both through a wealth
effectand by raising investment. Ibwever, as noted in the discussion
of Figure 4, this effect is assumed to be snall.
27Thegraphical analysis raisen the possibility that the su'pl:T side
exchange rate effect could lead to a fall in output when the money
stock rises. This possibility can be ruled out by noting that if the
price level were to rise in the same proportion as the money stock,
with output at its original level, the assets markets would bein
equilibrium, the demandfor goods would be at its original level, but
supply would exceed demand.
28Ina more detailed model, an l money stock increase could result
from a change in reserve requirements that would not necessarily
affect the government budget.42
29Sucha variablewould performfor foreign currency linkedsecurities
a role almost identical to that of qfor capital: the value of the
stockof such assets(the left hand side of the market clearing
equation) wouldreflect the prnium; the interest component of the
return wouldbe reducedbecauseof the higher costofthe asset; and
expectationsofchangesin ;the premiuii would affect theexpected
return on the asset.
30 The presence of the (l4) and (1 terms with b and(fd_rs)
respectivelyisa result of the assumption that theinitialstockof
bonds in period t is sold at the end of period t—1.
31Seelnick and Sokoler (forthcoming) for calcualtiorisof the
effects of reductions in the growth rate of the economy onthe
inflation rate when inflation is used to generate government revenue.
32j issued is discussed in Fischer and Frenkel (1981) and in anMIT
B.S. thesis by I)vid Lebow (1983).
33The balance of paiients problem is discussed by Ilalevi and Klinov—
Walul(1968), Michaely(1975). are' Karni (1979).
Edi Karmipoints out thatmuch of external borrowing during the
seventies was at negative real rates.
Defense imports overstate the defense burden on the balanceof
payments, since it is doubtful Israel would be exportingarms if it
were not for the defense burden of the past.
36Michaely (1974) describes the methods used to affect the balanceof
tradeandpayments. He also calculates effectivereal exchange rates,
whichshow little change over the period1955—71.
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realstock of index bonds
Pt
relativeprice of installed capital
Ktphysical capital stock
eexchange rate
F holdings by domestic residents of foreign—issued foreign currency
bonds (measured in foreign currency)
d . .
Ftholdings by domestic residents of domestically issuedforeign
currency bonds (measured in foreign currency)
Br real yield on index bonds
FKmarginal product of capital
w.wage rate
Gt domestic government purchase of goods and services
Tt net taxes
reserves
FAt foreign aid, (measured in foreign currency)
G government purchases abroad (measured in foreign currency)44





rrCreal interest rate onforeign currency bonds(measured in donestic
goods)
rs per capita reserves (measured in real terms)
faper capita forei aid (measured in real terms)
gfper capita government purchases abroad (measured inreal terms)45
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